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ABSTRACT
Manuscript Type: Empirical
Research Question/Issue: This study examines the effectiveness of restructuring in repairing legitimacy after a firm is
punished for financial fraud.
Research Findings/Insights: We use the antecedents of fraud to distinguish between three types of financial fraud and
argue that different types of such fraud affect different dimensions of legitimacy. We also identify four types of restruc-
turing and adopt a contingency perspective to argue that the type of restructuring adopted should match the dimensions
of legitimacy affected for a successful legitimacy repair, which is proxied by a positive market response when the
restructuring is announced. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms, we find that disassociation from illegitimate business
operations and creation of valuable business operations are more effective in repairing legitimacy after fraudulent financial
reporting. Disassociation from illegitimate organizational structures and creation of monitors are more effective following
embezzlement or stock market manipulation. However, no type of restructuring is effective following improper account-
ing practice. Market investors value creation of monitors more than they do disassociation from an illegitimate organiza-
tional structure, and attach the same value to disassociation from illegitimate business operations and creation of valuable
business operations.
Theoretical/Academic Implications: This study makes three contributions to the organizational legitimacy and corporate
crisis management literature. First, it links corporate crises arising from financial fraud to social legitimacy. Second, it
extends the number of restructuring types identified in the legitimacy literature to four, taking content and form as two
dimensions. Third, it links corporate crises arising from financial fraud to the effectiveness of responsive restructurings via
social legitimacy.
Practitioner/Policy Implications: Firms punished for financial fraud should signal restructuring according to the nature of
the fraud and address the pertinent dimensions of legitimacy.
Keywords: Corporate Governance, Financial Fraud, Social Legitimacy, Restructuring
INTRODUCTION
O rganizational crisis management is an important topicbecause an organizational crisis will negatively affect
the legitimacy of the organization, which may further
threaten the organization’s survival in the worst-case sce-
nario. In this sense, organizational crisis management is
simply the procedure by which the firm seeks to repair orga-
nizational legitimacy.Although the last several decades have
seen a productive stream of research on crisis management
(e.g., Agrawal, Jaffe, & Karpoff, 1999; Elsbach & Sutton, 1992;
Livingston, 1997; Schlenker, 1980; Staw, Mckechnie, &
Puffer, 1983; Tedeschi, 1981), organizational crises have only
recently been examined from a social interaction perspective
(Breitsohl, 2009). Moreover, while image restoration strate-
gies have been incorporated into explanations of effective
crisis management, it remains unclear why some reactions
are useful in overcoming a certain type of crisis, while others
are not.
This study seeks to understand organizational crisis man-
agement from a social interactive perspective by linking
organizational crises with the effectiveness of response strat-
egies via social legitimacy. Specifically, we focus on the pun-
ishment of corporate financial fraud, a typical organizational
crisis that threatens the social legitimacy of the organization.
According to Zahra, Priem, and Rasheed (2005), corporate
financial fraud refers to deliberate action taken by manage-
ment at any level to deceive, con, swindle, or cheat investors
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or other key stakeholders. When the fraud is publicly
revealed and punished, the firm will be penalized not only
through litigation, but also via a loss of social legitimacy. For
example, it will lose support from market investors, who
will no longer have confidence in the firm’s performance
and credibility (Karpoff & Lott, 1993). These effects will
lead to negative market response (Karpoff & Lott, 1993),
which is an indicator of a legitimacy crisis. The firm must
take steps to repair its legitimacy to regain support from
market investors.
Prior literature on legitimacy suggests that to repair its
legitimacy, the firm can either normalize its accounts or ini-
tiate a restructuring (Suchman, 1995). The account normal-
ization strategy is addressed in the impression management
literature, which stresses the importance of communication
following a crisis. Communication is effective when the
fraud is disclosed through the “bamboo telegraph” rather
than being publicly revealed (Schlenker, 1980; Tedeschi,
1981). When the fraud is publicly revealed, the firm is better
advised to take substantive measures to signal the effort it is
making to reduce the likelihood of fraud occurring in future.
Suchman (1995) identifies two types of restructuring strat-
egies aimed at repairing legitimacy: creating a monitoring
mechanism and disassociation from key individuals, pro-
cesses, structures, etc. Later studies follow Suchman (1995)
and examine whether firms implement more leadership
changes or improve their monitoring systems after revela-
tions of fraud. However, empirical results are not entirely
consistent with the finding that firms predominantly adopt
monitoring and disassociation strategies: some empirical
studies have lent support to such a prediction (Farber, 2005;
Gerety & Lehn, 1997; Livingston, 1997), while others have
not (Agrawal et al., 1999; Fich & Shivdasani, 2005).
These inconsistent results could be attributed to two
reasons. First, prior studies may not have recognized that
there are several distinct types of financial fraud, each of
which may hurt different dimensions of legitimacy. For
example, some financial frauds may hurt the firm’s moral
legitimacy, as a result of which the market will challenge the
firm’s intentions. Othersmayhurt the firm’s pragmatic legiti-
macy, following which the market will lose confidence in the
firm’s ability to provide value. The response strategy adopted
should match the distinct legitimacy dimension requiring
attention for an optimal effect (Suchman, 1995). Second, the
response strategies examined in prior studies are limited to
organizational restructurings, which may be more effective
for some types of fraud, but not for others. To repair legiti-
macy following other types of fraud, organizationsmay need
to restructure other aspects of their operations.
This study seeks to fill the gaps in the literature identified
above. Mainly drawing from literature on financial fraud
and organizational legitimacy, we adopt a contingency per-
spective to examine the effectiveness of restructurings in
repairing legitimacy after firms are punished for different
types of financial fraud. We identify four dimensions of
organizational legitimacy: regulative, pragmatic, moral, and
cognitive legitimacy. We then argue that the detection of
financial fraud may hurt different dimensions of organiza-
tional legitimacy, although all forms of financial fraud hurt
regulative legitimacy. We examine the diverse range of ante-
cedents of financial fraud: one of the antecedents of fraudu-
lent financial reporting, which hurts the firm’s pragmatic
legitimacy, is performance pressure; one of the antecedents
of embezzlement and stock market manipulation, which
damages the organization’s moral legitimacy, is insider
interests; improper accounting practice, which hurts the
regulative legitimacy of the firm, is not motivated by either
performance pressure or insiders’ intentions to seize ben-
efits that properly belong to the firm or to other stakehold-
ers. We also regard content and form as two dimensions in
identifying four types of restructuring aimed at responding
to a legitimacy crisis: disassociation from an illegitimate
organizational structure, disassociation from illegitimate
business operations, creation of monitors, and creation of
valuable business operations. We argue that the type of
restructuring implemented should match the dimension(s)
of legitimacy requiring attention for a successful legitimacy
repair, which is proxied by a positive market response when
the restructuring is announced.
Taking Chinese listed firms punished for financial fraud
(fraud firms) and matched nonfraud firms (nonfraud firms)
as our sample, we first conduct an event study to compare
the market response with restructuring announcements
made by the fraud firms and the nonfraud firms. We then
use ordinary least squares (OLS) regression models to
examine whether and how the market response to a restruc-
turing announcement depends on the nature of the financial
fraud. Our results show that the four types of restructuring
lead to a more positive market response for the fraud firms
than for the nonfraud firms. Disassociation from illegitimate
business operations and creation of valuable business opera-
tions are more effective restructuring strategies for firms
punished for fraudulent financial reporting, which hurts
firms’ pragmatic legitimacy. Disassociation from illegitimate
organizational structures and creation of monitors are more
effective strategies for firms punished for embezzlement or
stock market manipulation, both of which hurt firms’ moral
legitimacy. However, no form of restructuring is effective in
repairing legitimacy following improper accounting prac-
tice. Market investors value creation of monitors more than
they do disassociation from an illegitimate organizational
structure, while they attach equal value to disassociation
from illegitimate business operations and creation of valu-
able business operations.
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND
Dimensions of Legitimacy Crises
The extant literature posits several classifications of organi-
zational legitimacy. For example, Scott (1995) proposes that
there are three types of organizational legitimacy: regula-
tive, normative, and cognitive. Regulative legitimacy is
derived on the basis of compliance with legal or quasi-legal
requirements in which the possibility of sanctions coerces
organizations into adherence to rules. Normative legitimacy
has a moral basis in that it mirrors perceived appropriate-
ness in terms of norms, which govern what is important and
how things should be done. Cognitive legitimacy reflects the
extent to which an organization and its activities are cultur-
ally supported and conceptually correct, i.e., the degree to
which a firm’s actions are taken for granted.
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Suchman (1995) identifies three dimensions of organiza-
tional legitimacy: pragmatic, moral, and cognitive. Prag-
matic legitimacy is based on stakeholders’ self-interest
calculations with respect to the expected value to be pro-
vided by the organization. Moral legitimacy reflects a posi-
tive normative evaluation of the organization and its
activities and rests on judgments about whether a certain
activity is “the right thing to do.” Cognitive legitimacy is
governed by shared definitions and frames of reference.
The normative legitimacy (Scott, 1995) and moral legiti-
macy (Suchman, 1995) constructs are conceptually equiva-
lent. Scott and Suchmans’ categorizations therefore suggest
that there are four major dimensions of organizational legiti-
macy: pragmatic legitimacy, moral legitimacy, cognitive
legitimacy, and regulative legitimacy. Among the four types
of legitimacy, regulative legitimacy has a special status
because it comes from actors who have sovereignty over
organizations such as government agencies. The other three
types of legitimacy flow from market investors. Because this
study focuses on the effectiveness of repairing legitimacy
derived from market investors, we do not consider regula-
tive legitimacy in detail here.
Response Strategies to Repair Legitimacy
Discussion of restructuring strategies in prior legitimacy lit-
eraturemainly focuses on two types. The first type of restruc-
turing includes replacing illegitimate executives, structures,
or procedures. It signals a parting from illegal influences and
reorientation toward more morally appropriate and regular
behavior (Scott, 1995; Suchman, 1995).We term this approach
dissociation from an illegitimate organizational structure.
The second type of restructuring is to establish a monitoring
system by employing board directors, block shareholders,
and other organizational structures (Suchman, 1995). Orga-
nizations use such monitoring systems to ensure they follow
appropriate procedures and perform in a morally acceptable
and rule-conforming manner. We term this type of restruc-
turing the creation of monitors. Both types of restructuring
signal that the organization should be considered an appro-
priate partner worthy of support.
The two forms of restructuring outlined above focus on
organizational structure. However, corporate restructuring
literature suggests that in addition to those that adjust the
organizational structure, restructurings can also focus on
reforming business operations including the firm’s business
portfolio and financial structure. A restructuring of business
operations sends a message to the market that the organiza-
tion is improving its operational efficiency and thus provid-
ing market investors with better utility. Business portfolio
restructurings can be implemented in severalways including
asset acquisitions whereby the firm purchases key assets
from a target company and stock acquisitions in which the
firm seeks to acquire control of a target company through a
stockpurchase or exchange. Both asset acquisitions and stock
acquisitions can be viewed as value creation strategies in
which the firm acquires valuable assets, projects, or product
lines. We refer to such acquisitions as the creation of valuable
business operations. Asset divestment refers to the sale of
assets such as tangible fixed assets or intangible assets to
other companies, while subsidiary divestment refers to the
sale of subsidiaries to other companies. Divestments can be
viewed as a form of disassociation from unproductive or
illegitimate business assets, projects, or product lines. Finan-
cial restructuring refers to a change in the firm’s capital
structure. Debt restructuring is one of the most important
ways inwhich the firm’s capital structure can be changed and
refers to an increase or decrease in firm leverage. Examples of
debt restructuring include interest forgiveness/deduction/
extension, the transfer of debt obligations, taking on new
debt, anddebt-for-equity swaps.Debt restructuring helps the
firm to move away from an unhealthy capital structure. We
refer to asset divestment, subsidiary divestment, and debt
restructuring as disassociation from illegitimate business
operations.
In summary, restructurings can be conducted on two
types of contents (organizational structure and business
operation) and in two distinct forms (disassociation and cre-
ation). Our conception of restructuring strategies based on
the two dimensions of content and form therefore gives us
four types of restructuring to respond to a legitimacy crisis:
disassociation from an illegitimate organizational structure
including the replacement of executives, organizational
structures and procedures; disassociation from illegitimate
business operations including asset divestment, subsidiary
divestment, and debt restructuring; the creation of monitors,
which refers to establishing a monitoring system incorporat-
ing board directors, block shareholders, and other organiza-
tional structures; and the creation of valuable business
operations including asset acquisition and stock acquisition.
These categories are shown in Figure 1.
Contingency Perspective
The contingency paradigm can be traced back to the work of
Chandler (1962). According to this paradigm, the effective-
ness of a strategy is contingent upon antecedent conditions
(Meyer, Tsui, & Hinings, 1993). In the context of this study,
the contingency rationale suggests that a legitimacy repair
strategy will be effective if the restructuring matches the
dimensions of legitimacy affected by the crisis. We apply
this framework to crises arising from the detection of finan-
cial fraud in the following section.
FIGURE 1
Four Types of Restructuring
 Organizational structure Business structure 
Disassociation Disassociation from illegitimate 
organizational structure  
(CEO dismissal) 
Disassociation from illegitimate 
business operations 
(Asset divestment 
Subsidiary divestment 
Debt restructuring) 
Creation Creation of monitors 
(Board chairman succession 
Ownership restructuring) 
Creation of valuable business 
operations
(Asset acquisition 
Stock acquisition) 
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Theoretical Development
Crises can occur in many forms. Marcus and Goodman
(1991) distinguish between three types: accidents, product
safety and health incidents, and scandals. This study focuses
on crises arising from the detection of financial fraud, which
can be viewed as a type of scandal, for two reasons. First,
from a theoretical perspective, the detection of financial
fraud could affect several dimensions of legitimacy includ-
ing regulative legitimacy, pragmatic legitimacy, and moral
legitimacy. It therefore provides us with an opportunity to
examine the contingency effect. Second, in terms of deniabil-
ity, while accidents are plausibly deniable because they
occur unexpectedly and product safety and health incidents
lie somewhere in the middle, scandals are difficult to deny
because their causes are misdeeds within the organization.
Organizations therefore need to accommodate crises arising
from the detection of financial fraud and react in a more
robust fashion, such as via a restructuring, to repair their
legitimacy, which is the focus of this study. Third, although
prior studies have examined the antecedents of financial
fraud, few have examined the effectiveness of response strat-
egies implemented in the wake of such malfeasance.
In this section, we develop two sets of hypotheses to
examine the effectiveness of restructuring efforts made to
repair legitimacy after firms are punished for financial fraud.
In the first set of hypotheses, we examine the effectiveness of
restructuring among fraud firms and nonfraud firms. In the
second set of hypotheses, we examine whether the effective-
ness of restructuring in repairing legitimacy depends on the
type of fraud committed, taking social legitimacy as the
latent construct.
According to Khurana and Lippincott (2000), when the
purpose of the restructuring is unclear, market investors
often fail to respond positively to the firm’s restructuring
proposal. Punishing a firm for financial fraud might chal-
lenge multiple dimensions of its legitimacy. The firm’s moral
legitimacy is called into question because of the morally
reprehensible behavior with which it is now associated. In
addition, given that financial fraud often arises because the
firm is not well managed and thus misreports its financial
performance, the firm’s pragmatic legitimacy is hurt. In such
a scenario, when a fraud firm announces a restructuring
plan, it sends out a message that it is taking steps to repair its
legitimacy by improving its operational performance or cor-
porate governance. In this sense, restructurings imple-
mented by fraud firms will give market investors a clearer
picture of their purpose than those conducted by nonfraud
firms. Restructuring announcements made by fraud firms
will therefore be met with a more positive market response
than those made by nonfraud firms. We therefore propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 1. All types of restructuring lead to a more positive
market response among fraud firms than they do among non-
fraud firms.
We next consider the nature of the financial fraud commit-
ted and identify which legitimacy dimension is affected by
each type of financial fraud. In terms of their consequences,
all types of financial fraud hurt firms’ regulative legitimacy
because they are criminal offenses and are subject to regu-
latory sanctions. However, because regulative legitimacy is
not our focus, we do not discuss it in detail here.
In addition to considering the consequences of different
forms of financial fraud, we also examine the motivations
underlying the conduct of the parties involved and differen-
tiate financial fraud into three types based on Clinard and
Quinney’s (1973) typology. These three types of financial
fraud will hurt different dimensions of the firm’s legitimacy.
Clinard and Quinney (1973) focus on the offense of finan-
cial fraud and differentiate corporate crimes from occupa-
tional crimes. Corporate crimes are those in which the firm
benefits while others in society are the victims. They are
motivated by performance pressure including the risk of
financial distress (Maksimovic & Titman, 1991), a lack of
financial slack (Stein, 1989), and high-growth potential
exceeding the firm’s financial capabilities (Bebchuk & Bar-
Gill, 2003; Wang, 2004). Fraudulent financial reporting is an
important corporate crime. Some firms commit fraudulent
financial reporting by misreporting their financial circum-
stances including earnings, revenue, and other aspects of
financial health. Fraudulent financial reporting allows firms
to avoid bankruptcy, raise external capital, and exercise their
recovery or growth options on favorable terms at the
expense of other stakeholders such as creditors andminority
shareholders. The detection of fraudulent financial reporting
will therefore lead market investors to believe that the firm
is not well managed and that the utility is threatened, thus
leading to a pragmatic legitimacy crisis.
Suchman (1995) explains that pragmatic legitimacy rests
on individual utility calculations. Therefore, offering tan-
gible rewards to stakeholders is more effective in gaining
pragmatic legitimacy. To repair pragmatic legitimacy follow-
ing the detection of fraudulent financial reporting, the firm
needs to convince the market that it no longer faces perfor-
mance pressure and no longer has an incentive to commit
such fraud. This will lead market investors to assess the
firm’s utility at a higher level.
As the public assesses firms’ payoffs from managers’
choice of business strategies (Fombrun & Shanley, 1990),
firms can restructure their business operations to inform
market investors about corporate managers’ preoccupations
and therefore signal the firm’s future payoff prospects. Firms
can signal their payoff prospects in two ways. On the one
hand, they can disassociate the firm from illegitimate busi-
ness operations. For example, divesting assets, spinning off
business lines, or selling subsidiaries could imply that the
firm is ridding itself of its inefficient sections and will
perform better in the future (e.g., Comment & Jarrell, 1995;
Hoskisson & Hitt, 1994; Markides, 1992). A debt restructur-
ing signals that the firm is disposing of nonperforming
capital and assets and thereby alleviating its liability pres-
sure and lowering the risk of financial distress. On the other
hand, firms can create valuable business operations. For
example, asset acquisitions and stock acquisitions could
indicate that the firm is in the process of expanding by pur-
suing promising projects or product lines (e.g., Hoskisson &
Hitt, 1990; Palmer, Barber, Zhou, & Soysal, 1995). Both the
disassociation from illegitimate business operations and the
creation of valuable business operations can inform market
investors of firms’ strategic adjustments to their business
portfolio and financial structure. This can help repair the
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firm’s pragmatic legitimacy as reflected in a positive market
response to the restructuring announcement. In contrast,
because restructurings that center on organizational struc-
ture, i.e., disassociation from an illegitimate organizational
structure and creation of monitors, cannot provide tangible
rewards to market investors, they are not particularly effec-
tive in repairing pragmatic legitimacy. We therefore propose
the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a. For firms punished for fraudulent financial
reporting, disassociation from illegitimate business operations
and creation of valuable business operations have a stronger
positive effect on the market response than do disassociation
from an illegitimate organizational structure and creation of
monitors.
Occupational crimes are those committed against a firm
but for the benefit of insiders (Clinard & Quinney, 1973).
They are not motivated by performance considerations, but
by the personal interests of a group of insiders (La Porta,
Lopez-de-Silanes, & Shleifer, 1999; Claessens, Djankov, Fan,
& Lang, 2002). Embezzlement and stock market manipula-
tion are two types of occupational crime. Embezzlement
refers to insiders (managers or block shareholders) stealing
the funds or property of an employer, company, or govern-
ment or misappropriating money or assets held in trust.
Stock market manipulation refers to an attempt made by
insider manipulators to influence the price of a stock by
buying, selling, or hyping it.1 Insider manipulators can then
profit from buying shares at a lower price and selling them
at a higher price (Aggarwal & Wu, 2003). In both types of
fraud, a group of insiders, such as the firm’s managers or
controlling owners, are the sole beneficiaries and the firm
and its other stakeholders are the victims. There is evidence
that a weak internal control structure, including a firm’s
leadership, procedures and structure headed by the board of
directors, the CEO, and the controlling shareholder(s),
encourages and facilitates the occurrence of occupational
crimes (Beasley, 1996; Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, &
Lapides, 2000; Chen, Firth, Gao, & Rui, 2005; Zahra et al.,
2005). When embezzlement or stock market manipulation is
detected in a firm, market investors will believe that the firm
intends to act in a manner contrary to their interests and that
their interests cannot be properly protected by the existing
internal control structure. In this scenario, the firm’s moral
legitimacy is at issue.
Suchman (1995) explains that providing tangible rewards
to the firm’s managers may be regarded as unacceptable in
moral terms because moral legitimacy requires a cultural
framework. Market investors evaluate moral legitimacy in
three ways: by examining outputs, by examining procedures
and structures, and by examining individuals (Scott, 1977;
Scott & Meyer, 1991). Procedural and structural legitimacy,
as well as individual legitimacy, become highly significant in
the absence of clear outcome measures (Scott, 1992). In our
research context, moral legitimacy, i.e., insiders’ intentions,
is not easy to observe or measure. To maintain the message
that they seek to repair the organization’s moral legitimacy,
organizations often address procedure and structure, as well
as individuals. The message can be sent in two ways. First,
firm leaders are perceived to be able to transcend and
reorder established routines. Firms thus can disassociate
themselves from critical leaders who are perceived to be
responsible for fraudulent behavior to dodge stigmatizing
events (Agrawal et al., 1999). Second, prior studies on finan-
cial fraud suggest that the creation of a better corporate
governance structure helps fraud firms to restore their repu-
tation (Farber, 2005). For example, changing the chairman of
the board can be a way of creating more effective board
monitoring. Ownership restructuring involves a change in
controlling rights such as a new main shareholder or an
adjustment in the main shareholder’s shareholding and is
associated with a decrease in the controlling shareholder’s
power and a greater voice for other block shareholders.
Ownership restructuring can be a way of creating more
effective monitoring by block shareholders.
In summary, when embezzlement or stock market
manipulation is detected in a firm, because the firm is not
necessarily subject to performance pressure, a restructuring
plan that addresses performance, i.e., disassociation from
illegitimate business operations and creation of valuable
business operations is likely to be ineffective. The firm
should instead adopt a form of organizational restructuring
that signals the firm’s intention to disassociate itself from the
individual(s) accused of illegitimate conduct or to create a
better monitoring structure. Restructuring proposals of this
kind are more effective in convincing the market that the
firm’s intentions are benign and that embezzlement or stock
market manipulation is less likely in future.
Hypothesis 2b. For firms punished for embezzlement or stock
market manipulation, disassociation from an illegitimate orga-
nizational structure and creation of monitors have a stronger
positive effect on market response than do disassociation from
illegitimate business operations and creation of valuable busi-
ness operations.
A third type of fraud which falls outside Clinard and
Quinney’s (1973) typology is improper accounting practice.
Improper accounting practice does not benefit the firm, its
insiders, or others in society. It is motivated by neither per-
formance pressure nor the self-interest of insiders, but is an
unintentional form of misbehavior. It therefore hurts the
firm’s regulative legitimacy, but does not damage its prag-
matic or moral legitimacy. To respond to a legitimacy crisis
engendered by improper accounting practice, simply disas-
sociating itself from the individuals involved in the illegality
or creating a monitoring system is likely to make a signifi-
cant contribution to the firm’s regulative legitimacy. A busi-
ness restructuring approach is not particularly appropriate
to regulative legitimacy. However, as noted earlier, regula-
tive legitimacy is derived from regulators rather than from
market investors. The market response is not an effective
indicator of regulators’ perceptions. In the case of improper
accounting practice, all four types of restructuring are likely
to make a weaker contribution to the market response than
they are in the cases of fraudulent financial reporting,
embezzlement, and stock market manipulation. We there-
fore propose the following hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2c. For firms punished for improper accounting
practice, all four types of restructuring have a weaker positive
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effect on the market response than they do for firms punished for
fraudulent financial reporting, embezzlement, or stock market
manipulation.
The link between financial fraud and a legitimacy crisis is
presented in Figure 2.
METHODOLOGY
Sample and Data
We test the hypotheses using a sample of Chinese listed
firms punished for fraud from 1998 to 2004.2 This is an ideal
empirical context in which to address our theoretical
concern. First, unlike in the Western world where financial
fraud is relatively uncommon, financial fraud is not a rare
phenomenon in the Chinese stock market (Zhang, 2004).
From 1993, when China’s stockmarket was established, until
2004, financial fraud was detected in over one-sixth of listed
firms in China on at least one occasion (Zhang, 2004).3
Second, although some scholars suggest that the sanctions
for financial fraud are not serious in China, crises arising
from financial fraud cannot be ignored. This is because the
stock market is regarded as a low-cost source of finance in
China. Detecting and punishing financial fraud will induce
market investors to challenge the firm’s legitimacy and to
sell its stock. To attract more capital, listed firms are con-
cerned about market investors’ perceptions of their legiti-
macy and reputation. Third, China has some unique cultural
characteristics that mean financial fraud will inevitably pre-
cipitate a legitimacy crisis. These characteristics include the
Confucian notion of saving face: listed firms will feel that
they have lost face if they are found to have engaged in
financial fraud (Hu, 1944) and have an incentive to recover
from the legitimacy crisis it entails. Fourth, Chinese listed
firms often turn to multiple forms of restructuring to
respond to crises (Kam, Citron, & Muradoglu, 2006).
Whether the various restructuring strategies fraud firms
adopt are appropriate responses to the legitimacy crises they
face is a question that deserves the attention of firms, market
investors, and scholars.
We use a four-step selection process to determine our
sample. We first collect and double check records on
penalties imposed on listed firms for financial fraud from
the China Stock Market Accounting Research database
(CSMAR) and the Web sites of the China Securities Regula-
tory Commission, the Shanghai Stock Exchange (SHSE), and
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE). We eliminate 21 firms
listed on China’s B-share market4 as this market is for
foreign investors and has stricter regulations than those
applicable to the A-share market in mainland China. We
drop a further 16 firms which had their listings suspended
within one year of being punished for financial fraud.
Second, when a firm is punished on multiple occasions
within a short period (e.g., one year), the same restructuring
plan can represent the firm’s response to a series of penal-
ties. To identify a unique penalty event for each restructur-
ing, we treat the last penalty imposed before a focal
restructuring in each year as the penalty event.
Third, to examine whether restructuring contributes
equally to fraud firms and nonfraud firms, we identify a
control firm for each fraud firm in the penalty year if the
potential firm (1) has the same four-digit Global Industry
Classification Standard (GICS) code as the fraud firm; (2) has
net sales and total assets that are closest to those of the fraud
firm (Agrawal et al., 1999; Farrell & Whidbee, 2002; Fich &
Shivdasani, 2005); and (3) has not had a fraud event reported
between 1994 and 2005.
Fourth, we collect all the restructuring announcements
made within one year of the penalty date from CSMAR. We
also collect financial data and daily stock prices from
CSMAR, which are matched with corporate governance
data from the China Center for Economic Research (CCER)
database.
This leaves us with a final sample of 147 fraud firms and
140 nonfraud firms with full information in the regression
model. Among the fraud firms, 123 firms have been pun-
ished on one occasion during the sample period, 16 have
been punished twice, and 8 have been punished three times.
Altogether, the 147 fraud firms account for 179 penalty
events covering 748 instances of financial fraud issued
between 1998 and 2004 (a firm may be punished for several
instances of financial fraud in the same penalty announce-
ment). We categorize the instances of fraud reported in
CSMAR into three types of fraud. Table 1 displays the
summary statistics for the fraud events. Of the fraud
instances, 72.68 per cent involve fraudulent financial report-
ing, 1.75 per cent involve stock market manipulation, 9.15
per cent involve embezzlement, and 16.42 per cent involve
improper accounting practice.
Firms often implement multiple restructurings to respond
to a legitimacy crisis. Among the firms in our sample, 32.40
per cent of the fraud firms have conducted more than one
restructuring after being punished for financial fraud and
46.39 per cent of the nonfraud firms have conducted more
than one restructuring after the corresponding fraud firms
have been punished for financial fraud. We take the restruc-
turing announcement date as the event date. There might be
multiple restructurings covering multiple types of restruc-
turing on the same event date. In our sample, the 147 fraud
firms have conducted 434 restructurings on 415 restructur-
ing event dates, while the 140 nonfraud firms have con-
ducted 371 restructurings on 329 restructuring event dates.
Table 2 shows the number of restructurings implemented
after penalties have been imposed for financial fraud.
The results are likely to be overstated if poorly performing
firms are more likely to drop out of the analysis than are
those that are performing well (or less poorly) or if the poor
FIGURE 2
Fraud Types and Legitimacy Crisis
Fraudulent
financial
reporting
Stock market 
manipulation 
and
embezzlement
Improper 
accounting
practice
Regulative legitimacy × × ×
Pragmatic legitimacy ×
Moral legitimacy ×
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performers are in the group that implement the least gover-
nance or operational change. However, such a survival bias
is not an issue in the Chinese stock market because there are
very few cases in which the firm is delisted (only 16 cases).
We simply drop these cases out of our sample.
Measures
Dependent Variable. We use cumulative abnormal
return (CAR) around the time of the restructuring
announcement to proxy the success of legitimacy repair.
CAR is calculated as the difference between the expected
return on a stock and the actual return following the
release of news to the market. Prior studies suggest that
examining CAR will allow us to gauge how the group of
society most directly affected by a firm’s actions (i.e.,
market investors) perceives the legitimacy of the firm’s
actions (Agrawal & Chadha, 2005; Arthaud-Day, Certo,
Dalton, & Dalton, 2006; Farber, 2005; Palmrose, Richardson,
& Scholz, 2004). This is because market investors’ percep-
tions can be reflected in their trading behavior. For
example, after the release of news of a firm’s financial
fraud, market investors will view the firm as illegitimate
because they will believe that the firm does not have the
ability and credibility required to work for their interests.
They will immediately reduce their holdings of the firm’s
stock, which will lead to a negative CAR (Agrawal &
Chadha, 2005; Palmrose et al., 2004). In this case, a negative
CAR is an indicator of legitimacy loss. In contrast, as
shown by Farber (2005), after a fraud firm makes improve-
ments in corporate governance, market investors perceive
the firm to be more legitimate because they believe the firm
can provide more value and be more credible. They will
buy the firm’s stock, which will lead to a positive CAR. In
this case, a positive CAR indicates that the firm has
regained legitimacy from market investors. Therefore,
CARs can be used to indicate that a company has lost or
regained social legitimacy from market investors. In this
study, we expect a restructuring will lead to a higher CAR
because it will help the firm regain legitimacy.
We calculate CARs for the fraud and nonfraud sample
over a three-day event window from one day before to one
day after the restructuring announcement day t0 using stan-
dard event study methodology (Dodd & Warner, 1983).
Market model parameters are estimated over the prior 200-
day interval. Restructuring announcements include those
declared by the fraud firm and by the nonfraud firm within
one year of the date on which the fraud firm is subject to
public sanctions. The detailed calculation procedure is pre-
sented in Appendix A.
TABLE 1
Fraud Punishment on the Listed Firms
Fraud categories Fraud instances in CSMAR Number of cases
Fraudulent financial reporting Fraudulent reporting 79
Inflated profit 52
Asset fabrication 12
A delay or postponement of report 291
Major failure to disclose information 106
Embezzlement Major shareholder embezzlement 25
Illegal guarantee 16
Unauthorized change in fund use 27
Fund provision violation 0
Stock market manipulation Insider trading 6
Stock price manipulation 5
Illegal hype 2
Improper accounting practice Others 122
Total fraud instances 748
Number of penalty events 179
Number of fraud firms 147
TABLE 2
Number of Restructurings After Punishment
Number of
restructurings
Number of penalty events
Fraud
firms
Nonfraud
firms
1 58 75
2 57 44
3 35 21
4 14 12
5 9 6
6 5 3
7 1 1
Total 179 162
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Independent Variables. Disassociation from an illegiti-
mate organizational structure. This is proxied by the occur-
rence of CEO dismissal. CEO dismissal is coded 1 if the CEO
is dismissed on the event date and 0 otherwise. We do not
distinguish between voluntary resignations and involuntary
dismissals because “face” and “harmony” are very impor-
tant in China. CEOs who leave their posts tend to claim that
they have done so voluntarily, even where they have actually
been dismissed.
Creation of monitors. This is measured by two variables.
First, wemeasure the creation of a better board as proxied by
the appointment of a new board chairman, which is coded 1
if there is a new board chairman on the event date and 0
otherwise. Second, we measure the creation of better moni-
toring from block-shareholders. This is represented by a
dummy variable coded 1 when the restructuring induces a
change of ownership structure on the event date and 0
otherwise.
Disassociation from illegitimate business operations. This
is measured by three dummy variables indicating the occur-
rence of asset divestment, subsidiary divestment, or debt
restructuring. These variables are coded 1 when there is any
asset divestment, subsidiary divestment, or debt restructur-
ing on the event date and 0 otherwise.
Creation of valuable business operations. This is measured
by two dummy variables indicating the occurrence of an
asset acquisition or stock acquisition. These variables are
coded 1 when there is an asset acquisition or stock acquisi-
tion on the event day and 0 otherwise.
Moderating Variables. Fraudulent financial reporting.
This includes fraud offenses reported in the CSMAR data-
base: fraudulent reporting, reporting inflated profit, asset
fabrication, a delay or postponement of the annual report or
other required report, and a major failure to disclose
information.
Embezzlement. This includes fraud offenses such as major
shareholder embezzlement, giving an illegal guarantee,
unauthorized change in the use of funds, and fund provision
violations.
Stock Market Manipulation. This includes fraud offenses
such as insider trading, stock price manipulation, and creat-
ing illegal hype.
Improper Accounting Practice. The financial fraud
offenses included in this category are erroneous accounting
practices and reporting practices.
We use the number of offenses listed in the penalty
announcement to measure the types of financial fraud com-
mitted by each firm.
The data for corporate restructurings and financial fraud
are coded on the basis of the definitions, categories, and
other information included in the CSMAR database.
CSMAR is a database that is widely used to study Chinese
listed firms. It has a clear scheme for the definitions and
categories of corporate restructuring and financial fraud.
Because the information CSMAR provides on listed firms is
in Chinese, we employ a Chinese PhD student majoring in
business policy to read the information in the CSMAR data-
base and code the data. As the definitions and the categories
of restructuring and financial fraud used in this study are
mostly consistent with those in the CSMAR database, there
is little ambiguity in the coding procedure. The coding
scheme used for corporate restructuring and financial fraud
is explained in Appendix B.
Control Variables. We control for alternative factors that
could affect a firm’s CAR. If a firmhas been in an unfavorable
situation for some time, market investors are likely to dis-
count the stock.We use average growth opportunity, external
financial need, andfinancial distress in years (t-2, t-1) toproxy
performance pressure (Wang, 2004). Growth opportunity is
measured by the book-to-market ratio and growth in operat-
ing revenue. External financial need is measured by the need
for external finance5 (Wang, 2004). Financial distress is mea-
sured by the long-termdebt to assets ratio and the short-term
debt to assets ratio. Firms that are penalized for fraud are
likely to experience a negative market response. Any rela-
tively positive gain seen in a fraud firm’s stock following a
restructuring announcement may be attributed to the fraud
firm’s stock already trading at a price lower than those of
nonfraud firms. We therefore control for the market reaction
following financial fraud penalties for both fraud firms and
nonfraud firms. This is measured by the three-day CAR
around the penalty announcement date. We also control for
firm size,which ismeasured as the logarithmof total assets at
the end of event year t-1, because a larger firmmay be viewed
as more capable and thus enjoy a higher stock price. We
control for current performance as measured by Return on
Asset (ROA) at the end of year t-1 because a positive market
response may be based on market investors’ positive evalu-
ation of the firm’s operating performance. ROA is calculated
by dividing a company’s annual earnings by its total assets.
Industry is controlled for by 19 dummies6 corresponding to
four-digit GICS categories. The descriptive statistics and the
correlation matrix are presented in Table 3.
Statistical Approach
We first conduct an event study to examine the market
response to restructuring announcements made by fraud
firms and nonfraud firms. We then regress the CARs calcu-
lated on the interaction between restructurings and types of
fraud to examine whether the market responses to restruc-
turing announcements differ for different types of fraud.
Given that one firm may initiate multiple restructurings
during the sample period, we use an OLS regression model
clustered by firm.
RESULTS
Event Study of Restructuring Announcements
In the event study, we calculate CARs to measure the market
response to restructuring announcements made by fraud
firms and nonfraud firms within one year of being punished
for fraud. The results are shown in Table 4.
Table 4 shows that among the types of restructuring
considered, creation restructurings including ownership
restructurings, stock acquisitions, and asset acquisitions
lead to positive CARs for fraud firms at the .01, .01, and .1
significance levels, respectively. These positive CARs for
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fraud firms are significantly larger than those for nonfraud
firms at the .05, .1, and .01 levels. In contrast, most of the
forms of disassociation restructuring do not lead to signifi-
cantly positive CARs for fraud firms. The exception is debt
restructurings, which have a significantly positive impact on
the CARs of fraud firms at the .05 level. These results
support Hypothesis 1, suggesting that restructurings can be
used as a response strategy to repair legitimacy after the firm
is punished for financial fraud. The results also imply that
although firms can turn to either disassociation restructur-
ings or creation restructurings, market investors may value
creation more than disassociation.
Regression Analysis
We then use CARs as the dependent variable to examine the
market response to restructuring announcements made by
the fraud firms and the nonfraud firms. The results are
shown in Table 5. Model 1 is tested using the full sample,
Model 2 is tested using the fraud firm sample, and Model 3
is tested using the nonfraud firm sample.
Among the forms of organizational creation restructuring,
ownership restructuring is positively significant for the fraud
firms (Model 2: b = .08, p < .01) but shows no significance
for the nonfraud firms. Among the forms of organ-
izational disassociation restructuring, CEOdismissal is insig-
nificant for both the fraud firms and the nonfraud firms.
Among the forms of business creation restructuring, asset
acquisition and stock acquisition have positive significance
for the fraud firms (Model 2: b = .04, p < .1; b = .05, p < .1), but
no significance for the nonfraud firms. Among the forms of
business disassociation restructuring, asset divestment has
positive significance for the fraud firms (Model 2: b = .04,
p < .1), but no significance for the nonfraud firms. Debt
restructuring has positive significance for the fraud firms
(Model 2: b = .27, p < .001), but negative significance for the
nonfraud firms (Model 3: b = –.11, p < .001). These results
suggest that the creation of a monitoring mechanism, the
creation of valuable business operations, and disassociation
from illegitimate business operations lead to a more positive
market response among fraud firms than they do among
nonfraud firms. Thus, Hypothesis 1 receives partial support.
Moreover, when comparing the aggregate effect of disasso-
ciation and creation for the fraud firms, we find that the effect
of business disassociation is not significantly different from
that of business creation.7 In contrast, the effect of organiza-
tional creation is significantly stronger than that of organiza-
tional disassociation (F = 7.14, p < .01). These results suggest
that market investors value organizational creation more
than they do organizational disassociation and attach equal
value to business creation and business disassociation.
We next examine the effectiveness of the various types of
restructuring in the context of each type of fraud. We use the
fraud firm subsample and interact the forms of restructuring
with the types of fraud in the regression models.8 The results
are shown in Table 6.
The Model 4 column in Table 6 shows the results for
fraudulent financial reporting. The main effect of fraudulent
financial reporting is negatively significant (Model 4:b = –.09,
p < .05). Debt restructuring is positively significant (Model 4:
b = .28, p < .001). The main effects of the other forms of
restructuring are not significant at all. When applied in the
context of fraudulent financial reporting, subsidiary divest-
ment and stock acquisition are positively related to the fraud
firms’ CARs (Model 4: b = .11, p < .05; b = .10, p < .05), while
board chairman succession and CEO dismissal are positively
significant (Model 4:b = .08, p < .1;b = .09, p < .05).However,
the aggregate impact of organizational restructurings
(disassociation + creation) in the context of fraudulent finan-
cial reporting is significantly lower than that of business
restructurings (disassociation + creation) for the same type of
fraud (F = 3.97, p < .05). These results suggest that all of the
forms of restructuring including business disassociation,
business creation, organizational disassociation, and organi-
zational creation arehelpful in repairing legitimacy following
fraudulent financial reporting. However, business restruc-
turings have a stronger impact on the success of efforts to
repair legitimacy following fraudulent financial reporting
than do organizational restructurings. Hypothesis 2a is thus
supported.
TABLE 4
Market Responses to Restructuring Events among Fraud Firms and Nonfraud Firms
Restructuring event Fraud
firms (1)
Cases Nonfraud
firms (2)
Cases p Value
(1) > (2)
CEO dismissal .00 90 .02 50 .05
Board chairman succession .00 81 .02 45 .08
Ownership restructuring .05** 64 .00 45 .03
Subsidiary divestment .02 80 .03† 64 .82
Asset divestment .04 40 .04† 45 .51
Stock acquisition .04*** 46 .02 68 .09
Asset acquisition .04** 27 -.01 53 .01
Debt restructuring .27* 6 -.05 1
Restructuring events .02*** 415 .02*** 329 .25
Number of sample firms 147 140
†p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001.
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The Model 5 column in Table 6 shows the results for
embezzlement. The main effect of embezzlement is signifi-
cantly negative (Model 5: b = –.18, p < .05). The main effects
of ownership restructuring, debt restructuring, asset divest-
ment, and asset acquisition are significantly positive (Model
5: b = .08, p < .01; b = .28, p < .001; b = .05, p < .1; b = .04,
p < .1). In the embezzlement context, board chairman suc-
cession and CEO dismissal are positively significant (Model
8: b = .18, p < .05; b = .21, p < .01). Among the interaction
terms between embezzlement and business restructurings,
only the interaction between embezzlement and subsidiary
divestment shows positive significance (Model 8: b = .18,
p < .05). The aggregate effect of organizational restructur-
ings (disassociation + creation) in the embezzlement context
is significantly greater than that of business restructurings
(disassociation + creation) in the context of the same type of
fraud (F = 6.08, p < .05). These results suggest that organiza-
tional disassociation, organizational creation, and business
disassociation contribute to legitimacy repair in the case of
embezzlement. However, organizational restructurings are
more effective in repairing legitimacy following embezzle-
ment than are business restructurings. Hypothesis 2b is
therefore supported.
TheModel 6 column inTable 6presents the results for stock
market manipulation. The main effect of stock market
manipulation is negatively significant (Model 6: b = –.09,
p < .05). Ownership restructuring, debt restructuring, asset
divestment, asset acquisition, and stock acquisition show
positive significance (Model 6: b = .09, p < .01; b = .26, p < .05;
b = .05, p < .05; b = .05, p < .05; b = .05, p < .05). The interac-
tion term between CEO dismissal and stock market manipu-
lation is positively significant (Model 6: b = .13, p < .1). These
results suggest that organizational disassociation is helpful in
repairing legitimacy following stock market manipulation.
Among the organizational creation strategies, board chair-
man succession is not significant in the context of stock
market manipulation, whereas ownership restructuring is
negatively significant (Model 6: b = –.28, p < .05). This result,
while unexpected, can be explained. Because stock market
manipulation is often associated with equity transactions
TABLE 5
Regression of CARs on Fraud Firms and Nonfraud Firms’ Restructuring
CARs Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Coefficient Standard
error
Coefficient Standard
error
Coefficient Standard
error
CEO dismissal .02 .01 .03 .03 .01 .01
Ownership restructuring .04** .02 .08** .03 -.02 .02
Board chairman succession .02 .01 .03 .03 -.01 .01
Asset divestment .04** .01 .04† .03 .01 .01
Subsidiary divestment .03* .01 .04 .03 -.01 .02
Debt restructuring .21*** .03 .27*** .04 -.11*** .02
Asset acquisition .01 .01 .06* .02 -.02 .01
Stock acquisition .03* .01 .05† .03 .01 .01
External financial need -.02† .01 -.06* .02 -.02† .01
Main revenue change .00 .00 .00 .00 .00* .00
Book-market ratio -.00** .00 -.00† .00 .01* .00
Long-term debt ratio -.29*** .05 -.40*** .06 .01 .07
Short-term debt ratio .00 .00 .00 .00 .13** .04
Sizet-1 .00 .00 .02** .01 -.01 .01
ROAt-1 -.01 .02 .02 .02 -.12* .06
CAR at time of penalty –.04 .05 –.09 .06 –.20 .19
Constant –.05 .08 –.34** .12 .07 .14
R-squared .23 .23 .30 .30 .51 .51
Adj. R-squared .19 .19 .25 .25 .45 .45
F (Disassociation from business =
creation of business)
1.05 1.05 .67 .67 .33 .33
F (Disassociation from org. =
creation of monitors)
4.61* 4.61* 7.14** 7.14** 3.20† 3.20†
Sample size 744 744 415 415 329 329
Notes: †p < .1, *p < .05, **p < .01, ***p < .001. All tests are two-tailed. Standard errors are given in parentheses.
Because of space limitations, we do not report the results for industry dummies in the table.
74 CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
Volume 18 Number 1 January 2010 © 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
T
A
B
L
E
6
Fr
au
d
P
en
al
ti
es
an
d
R
es
tr
u
ct
u
ri
n
g
am
on
g
Fr
au
d
Fi
rm
s
M
od
el
4
Fr
au
du
le
nt
re
po
rt
in
g
M
od
el
5
E
m
be
zz
le
m
en
t
M
od
el
6
M
an
ip
ul
at
io
n
of
st
oc
k
m
ar
ke
t
M
od
el
7
Im
pr
op
er
ac
co
un
ti
ng
pr
ac
ti
ce
C
A
R
s
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
r
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
r
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
r
C
oe
ffi
ci
en
t
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
r
C
E
O
d
is
m
is
sa
l
-.
06
.0
6
.0
0
.0
3
.0
2
.0
3
.0
5†
.0
3
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g
.0
5
.0
6
.0
8*
*
.0
3
.0
9*
*
.0
3
.1
1*
**
.0
3
B
oa
rd
ch
ai
rm
an
su
cc
es
si
on
-.
05
.0
6
.0
1
.0
3
.0
2
.0
3
.0
6*
.0
3
A
ss
et
d
iv
es
tm
en
t
-.
01
.0
5
.0
5†
.0
3
.0
5*
.0
2
.0
5†
.0
3
Su
bs
id
ia
ry
d
iv
es
tm
en
t
-.
08
.0
6
.0
2
.0
3
.0
3
.0
2
.0
6*
.0
3
D
eb
t
re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g
.2
8*
**
.0
4
.2
8*
**
.0
4
.2
6*
.1
1
.2
4*
**
.0
4
A
ss
et
ac
qu
is
it
io
n
.0
5
.0
4
.0
4†
.0
3
.0
5*
.0
2
.0
8*
*
.0
3
St
oc
k
ac
qu
is
it
io
n
-.
06
.0
6
.0
3
.0
3
.0
5*
.0
2
.0
7*
.0
3
Fr
au
d
-.
09
*
.0
4
-.
18
*
.0
7
-.
09
*
.0
4
.1
4*
*
.0
6
C
E
O
d
is
m
is
sa
l¥
fr
au
d
.0
9*
.0
4
.2
1*
*
.0
8
.1
3†
.0
7
-.
13
*
.0
6
B
oa
rd
ch
ai
rm
an
su
cc
es
si
on
¥
fr
au
d
.0
8†
.0
4
.1
8*
.0
8
.0
6
.0
5
-.
17
**
.0
6
O
w
ne
rs
hi
p
re
st
ru
ct
ur
in
g
¥
fr
au
d
.0
4
.0
4
.0
5
.0
8
-.
28
*
.1
2
-.
15
*
.0
6
A
ss
et
d
iv
es
tm
en
t¥
fr
au
d
.0
6
.0
4
.0
7
.0
8
-.
36
**
*
.0
3
-.
08
.0
6
Su
bs
id
ia
ry
d
iv
es
tm
en
t¥
fr
au
d
.1
1*
.0
4
.1
8*
.0
8
-.
14
*
.0
6
A
ss
et
ac
qu
is
it
io
n
¥
fr
au
d
.0
1
.0
3
.0
6
.0
8
-.
07
.0
5
St
oc
k
ac
qu
is
it
io
n
¥
fr
au
d
.1
0*
.0
4
.1
3
.1
0
.0
0
.0
5
-.
15
*
.0
6
E
xt
er
na
lfi
na
nc
ia
ln
ee
d
-.
06
*
.0
2
-.
06
*
.0
2
-.
07
**
.0
2
-.
05
†
.0
2
O
pe
ra
ti
ng
re
ve
nu
e
gr
ow
th
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
B
oo
k
to
m
ar
ke
t
ra
ti
o
.0
0†
.0
0
.0
0†
.0
0
.0
0*
*
.0
0
.0
0†
.0
0
L
on
g-
te
rm
d
eb
t
ra
ti
o
-.
38
**
*
.0
6
-.
37
**
*
.0
6
-.
19
†
.1
0
-.
40
**
*
.0
6
Sh
or
t-
te
rm
d
eb
t
ra
ti
o
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
.0
0
Si
ze
t-
1
.0
2*
*
.0
1
.0
2*
*
.0
1
.0
1
.0
1
.0
2*
*
.0
1
R
O
A
t-
1
.0
2
.0
2
.0
2
.0
2
.0
4†
.0
2
.0
2
.0
2
C
A
R
at
ti
m
e
of
pe
na
lty
-.
08
.0
5
-.
09
.0
5
-.
06
.0
8
-.
08
.0
6
C
on
st
an
t
-.
23
†
.1
3
-.
30
*
.1
2
-.
17
.1
3
-.
37
**
.1
2
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
.3
5
.3
5
.3
6
.3
6
.4
1
.4
1
.3
2
.3
2
A
d
j.
R
-s
qu
ar
ed
.2
8
.2
8
.2
9
.2
9
.3
5
.3
5
.2
5
.2
5
F
(O
rg
an
iz
at
io
n
=
bu
si
ne
ss
)
3.
97
*
3.
97
*
6.
08
*
6.
08
*
2.
74
†
2.
74
†
–
–
F
(D
is
as
so
ci
at
io
n
fr
om
bu
si
ne
ss
=
cr
ea
ti
on
of
bu
si
ne
ss
)
2.
39
2.
39
–
–
F
(D
is
as
so
ci
at
io
n
fr
om
or
g
=
cr
ea
ti
on
of
m
on
it
or
s)
.7
9
.7
9
3.
85
†
3.
85
†
–
–
Sa
m
pl
e
si
ze
41
5
41
5
41
5
41
5
41
5
41
5
41
5
41
5
N
ot
es
:
†p
<
.1
,*
p
<
.0
5,
**
p
<
.0
1,
**
*p
<
.0
01
.A
ll
te
st
s
ar
e
tw
o-
ta
ile
d.
St
an
da
rd
er
ro
rs
ar
e
gi
ve
n
in
pa
re
nt
he
se
s.
B
ec
au
se
of
sp
ac
e
lim
ita
ti
on
s,
w
e
d
o
no
t
re
po
rt
th
e
re
su
lts
fo
r
in
du
st
ry
du
m
m
ie
s
in
th
e
ta
bl
e.
RESTRUCTURING TO REPAIR LEGITIMACY 75
Volume 18 Number 1 January 2010© 2010 Blackwell Publishing Ltd
which lead to a change in the ownership structure, it is
reasonable for themarket to viewownership restructuring as
a form of stock market manipulation. Among business
restructurings, none other than asset divestment interacted
with stockmarketmanipulation have a significantly negative
effect (Model 6: b = –.36, p < .001). These results suggest that
business restructurings do not lead to a positive market
response if the firm is punished for stock market manipula-
tion. The aggregate effect of organizational restructurings
(disassociation + creation) in the context of stock market
manipulation is significantly stronger than that of business
restructurings (disassociation + creation) in the same context
(F = 2.74; p < . 1). These results also support Hypothesis 2b.
The Model 7 column in Table 6 shows the results for
improper accounting practice. The main effect of improper
accounting practice is significantly positive (Model 7: b = .14,
p < .01). The main effects of ownership restructuring, CEO
dismissal, board chairman succession, debt restructuring,
asset divestment, subsidiary divestment, asset acquisition,
and stock acquisition show positive significance (Model 7:
b = .11, p < .001; b = .05, p < .1; b = .06, p < .05; b = .24,
p < .001; b = .05, p < .1; b = .06, p < .05; b = .08, p < .01; b = .07,
p < .05). The interactions between improper accounting
practice and forms of restructuring including board chair-
man succession, CEO dismissal, subsidiary divestment, and
stock acquisition are negatively related to CARs (Model 7:
b = –.17, p < .01; b = –.13, p < .05; b = –.15, p < .05; b = –.14,
p < .05; b = –.15, p < .05). These results suggest that restruc-
turings have a weaker effect on repairing legitimacy follow-
ing improper accounting practice than they do following
instances of fraudulent financial reporting, embezzlement,
and stock market manipulation.
In most of the model results reported in Tables 5 and 6,
external financial need, the book-market ratio, and the long-
term debt to assets ratio show negative significance, suggest-
ing that financial requirements, high growth, and financial
distress are negatively related to market performance
among fraud firms. In Models 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7, size is posi-
tively significant for stock performance, suggesting that
market investors perceive large fraud firms to be more able
to respond to a legitimacy crisis and reward them with
higher valuations. ROA shows positive significance (Model
6: b = –.04, p < .1).
DISCUSSION
This study begins by noting that although scholars have
focused on organizational crisis management for several
decades, it remains unclear why some reactions are useful in
overcoming certain types of crisis, while others are not. We
seek to answer this question by identifying the mechanism
behind stakeholder perceptions of the different types of
crisis and the organizational reactions to them. We specifi-
cally focus on one type of crisis: that arising from the impo-
sition of penalties for financial fraud. We examine the
effectiveness of various forms of restructuring aimed at
repairing legitimacy after the firm has been punished for
different types of financial fraud.
We first show that fraud firms initiate restructuring plans
to signal that they are disassociating themselves from ille-
gitimate forms of business or organizational influences or to
create valuable business operations or a monitoring system.
As the purpose of these forms of restructuring are clearer in
fraud firms than in nonfraud firms, they all lead to a more
positive market response among fraud firms than they do
among nonfraud firms. Restructuring can thus be an effec-
tive signaling strategy to repair legitimacy after a firm is
punished for financial fraud. In examining the effectiveness
of disassociation versus creation, we find that while market
investors value the creation of valuable business operations
and disassociation from illegitimate business operations to
the same extent, they value the implementation of a better
monitoring system more highly than they do disassociation
from individuals involved in illegitimate conduct. This result
is consistent with the study of Boeker (1992), who suggests
that in firms with performance issues but high CEO power,
CEO turnover tends to be a ceremonial or scapegoating
tactic. This study also supports the view that market inves-
tors may view disassociation from individuals involved in
illegitimate conduct as a ceremonial tactic and require some
discount for it.
We then link the effectiveness of restructurings with
financial fraud crises via social legitimacy. The detection of
financial fraud may hurt a firm’s legitimacy in a number of
dimensions. When the firm is punished for financial fraud,
the firm’s regulative legitimacy will certainly suffer. We also
show that financial fraud can be classified into three types
based on the antecedents of this type of corporate malfea-
sance and that they may hurt different dimensions of orga-
nizational legitimacy.
Fraudulent financial reporting is motivated by pressure to
perform. The detection of fraudulent financial reporting will
lead market investors to question the firm’s ability to
provide utility, as a result of which the firm’s pragmatic
legitimacy will be challenged. For this type of financial
fraud, a restructuring of business operations will be more
effective than a restructuring of the organizational structure
in repairing the firm’s legitimacy. The firm can initiate a
restructuring to disassociate itself from illegitimate business
operations by, for example, divesting itself of inefficient
assets, projects, or even subsidiaries. Alternatively, the firm
can create value through acquiring assets or firms to allow it
to enter new businesses. In so doing, the firm is expected to
increase cash flow, to reduce operating costs, and to focus on
amore efficient business portfolio. The firm therefore signals
that it can improve its operations and provide market inves-
tors with more tangible rewards (Suchman, 1995). Its prag-
matic legitimacy will be restored.
Embezzlement is motivated by the incentive of controlling
shareholders to seize the firm’s wealth for their own use.
Stock market manipulation is motivated by the incentive of
Top Management Team members or controlling sharehold-
ers to gain from manipulating the stock price, insider
trading, or illegal hype. The detection of these types of fraud
will lead market investors to believe that insiders are inten-
tionally working against their interest, calling the firm’s
moral legitimacy into question. For such types of financial
fraud, a restructuring of the firm’s organizational structure is
more effective than a restructuring of its business operations
in repairing the firm’s legitimacy. Given the absence of clear
outcome measures for moral legitimacy, the firm has to
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address the legitimacy of individuals or structural legiti-
macy. The firm can initiate a restructuring to disassociate
itself from the individuals who are responsible for the illegal
behavior such as the CEO. Alternatively, the firm can create
an organizational structure that enables it to monitor insid-
ers by changing the board chairman or reducing the ultimate
controller’s voting power through an ownership restructur-
ing. This will allow the firm to convince market investors
that the organization has appropriate individuals and struc-
tures in place and that it will act beyond reproach going
forward, thus restoring its moral legitimacy. Our results also
give empirical support to prior studies which report higher
leadership turnover after fraud revelations (Agrawal et al.,
1999; Livingston, 1997).
Ownership restructuring is a special form of restructuring.
As shown by our results, ownership restructuring leads to a
positiveCAR for all types of fraud.However, the interactions
between ownership restructuring and fraudulent financial
reporting and embezzlement are not significant. These
results, which are inconsistent with our prediction, can be
explained by the way in which ownership restructurings can
be used to address both pragmatic legitimacy and moral
legitimacy. First, the dominant stockholder can encourage the
firm to commit fraud as other shareholders are not in a
position to play an effective monitoring role (Chen et al.,
2005). Ownership restructurings can result in bettermonitor-
ing from other block shareholders than business restructur-
ings, as we predict in Hypothesis 2b. Furthermore,
ownership restructuring is often realized by introducingnew
owners into the firm. New owners often bring in additional
resources, thus alleviating financial pressure. Hence, owner-
ship restructuring is a strategy that can be used to address
both pragmatic legitimacy and moral legitimacy.
Improper accounting practice, which includes improper
financial reporting, improper practice on the part of the CEO
or the board of directors, etc., is not motivated by pressure to
perform or insiders’ manipulation of the firm’s wealth. It
damages the firm’s regulative legitimacy, but does not have
a negative impact on its pragmatic or moral legitimacy. We
have shown that all the forms of restructuring we examine
have a weaker effect on legitimacy repair in the case of
improper accounting practice than they do in the cases of
fraudulent financial reporting, embezzlement, and stock
market manipulation. This result is not unexpected because
regulative legitimacy is derived from regulators rather than
from market investors. Market response is not an effective
measure of success in repairing regulative legitimacy.
CONCLUSION
This study examines the effectiveness of different forms of
restructuring implemented to repair legitimacy after a firm
has been punished for different types of financial fraud. We
make three major contributions to the organizational crisis
and organizational legitimacy literature.
First, although much effort has been made to examine
organizational crises, the mechanisms underlying the social
dimension of organizational crises remain unclear. This
study links corporate crises with the social legitimacy con-
struct. We argue that all types of financial fraud hurt the
regulative legitimacy of the firm and show that different
types of financial fraud have different antecedents. Further-
more, different types of financial fraud can damage different
dimensions of social legitimacy. Fraudulent financial report-
ing, which is motivated by performance pressure, will hurt
the pragmatic legitimacy of the firm.On the other hand, stock
market manipulation and embezzlement, which are gener-
ally motivated by insiders’ interests, will harm the firm’s
moral legitimacy. Improper accounting practice, which is not
motivated by performance pressure or insiders’ interests,
hurts only the regulative legitimacy of the organization.
The second major contribution this study makes is to
provide a more comprehensive list of responsive restructur-
ings to repair legitimacy. The restructuring strategies dis-
cussed in prior legitimacy literature mainly centre on
organizational structure, i.e., disassociation from key indi-
viduals, processes, and structures, and the creation of moni-
tors (Suchman, 1995). We introduce restructurings of
business operations to the list of measures that can be taken
to restore legitimacy. Our conception of restructuring
according to the two dimensions of content and form allows
us to extend the menu of potential restructuring strategies to
four categories: disassociation from an illegitimate organiza-
tional structure, disassociation from illegitimate business
operations, the creation of better monitoring, and the cre-
ation of valuable business operations.
Third, this study links the effectiveness of restructurings
with corporate crises resulting from financial fraud via social
legitimacy. We show that to restore its legitimacy, the firm
should initiate a restructuring according to the nature of the
fraud and address the pertinent dimensions of legitimacy.
Organizational disassociation and organizational creation
are more effective means of repairing moral legitimacy fol-
lowing embezzlement or stock market manipulation, while
business disassociation and business creation aremore effec-
tive strategies for repairing pragmatic legitimacy in the wake
of fraudulent financial reporting. Market investors value
organizational creation more than they do organizational
disassociation, while they attribute equal value to business
creation and business disassociation initiatives.
Despite the advances this study makes, it is subject to a
number of limitations. First, we do not identify a direct
indicator of legitimacy. The best way to measure legitimacy
is to use the stakeholders’ perceptions (including those of
market investors and regulators) of each dimension of legiti-
macy after the firm is punished for financial fraud or
announces a restructuring. However, because our sample is
based on past events (1998–2004), we cannot accurately
assess the perceptions of stakeholders at the time. We are
therefore obliged to measure the success of legitimacy res-
toration efforts using a second-best approach by assessing
market reaction. The effectiveness of this indicator depends
to a great extent on the efficiency of the market, which may
be doubtful in the case of China. However, substantial
empirical evidence indicates that the stock market is weak-
form and semi-strong-form efficient and that new informa-
tion is rapidly incorporated into prices (Chen, Chen, & Su,
2001; Wei & Fan, 2000). This gives us confidence that stock
returns can be used to measure market investors’ views of
firms’ actions and are an acceptable indicator of market
investors’ views on legitimacy.
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The second limitation of this study is that because finan-
cial fraud is often a result of corporate crime, the firm’s
regulative legitimacy will be challenged. However, because
regulative legitimacy flows from regulators rather than
from market investors, market response cannot be an effec-
tive measure for regulative legitimacy. This prevents us
from considering regulative legitimacy in this study.
The third limitation we would highlight is our use of a
dummy that indicates the occurrence of each type of
restructuring on the event date to represent the various
forms of restructuring. This is not a perfect measure
because on an event date, each type of restructuring may
involve multiple transactions with different values. While
the best way of measuring restructurings is to use the value
they bring to the firm, we do not have this information
available to us. Another alternative is to use the number of
each type of restructuring. However, it is difficult to define
the number of each type of restructuring if a certain type
of restructuring is composed of several transactions. For
example, a firm may announce that it is divesting several
obsolete assets to several buyers. It is difficult to define this
restructuring as either a single divestiture or as several
divestitures. Even we define it as several divestitures, it is
doubtful that market investors will value two asset dives-
titures more highly than one asset divestiture if we do not
incorporate the value of the assets divested. In the sense
that restructuring is a signaling strategy aimed at repairing
the firm’s legitimacy, market investors should be more sen-
sitive to its occurrence than to the value or number of
restructurings. We therefore believe that using dummies to
indicate the occurrence of restructurings on the event date
represents a second-best approach.
The fourth limitationwe have identified is thatwe examine
only the content of restructuringswhile ignoring their depth.
According to prior studies, some restructurings are superfi-
cial actions taken to manipulate earnings (Ding, Zhang, &
Zhang, 2007; Jian & Wong, 2006; Jiang & Wang, 2003; Liu &
Lu, 2007). It is possible that market investors are able to
identify such superficial restructurings and require a dis-
count (Suchman, 1995). Our results also give us some clues.
We show that CEO dismissal is less valued by market inves-
tors as it may be viewed as a ceremonial tactic. This could
constitute a potential opportunity to extend the current lit-
erature. A fifth shortcoming of this study is that it is con-
ducted in a single country; we expect researchers to test the
generalizability of our results in other countries in future.
Despite these limitations, this study is among the first to
seek to link corporate crises resulting from financial fraud
with the effectiveness of responsive restructurings via social
legitimacy. It has some important implications for corporate
decision makers and provides a sociological basis for
improved recommendations for effective crisis management.
When a firm is required to deal with a crisis after being
publicly sanctioned for financial fraud or a similar incident, it
is important to initiate a restructuring plan according to the
nature of the legitimacy crisis. We also show that market
investors value the creation of monitoringmechanismsmore
highly than they do disassociation from individuals involved
in illegal conduct. It is clear that this is where firms tainted by
fraud should concentrate their restructuring efforts if they
seek to regain their moral legitimacy.
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NOTES
1. Manipulators can potentially include any informed party such
as a corporate insider, broker, underwriter, large shareholder or
market maker (Aggarwal &Wu, 2003). In this study, we examine
only penalties for fraud among firms. Therefore, corporate insid-
ers and block shareholders are the two groups of potential
manipulators.
2. All firms that have been found to have committed financial fraud
have been punished, but the seriousness of the penalties imposed
varies. However, as the level of punishment is beyond the scope
of this study, we do not provide the relevant information.
3. Zhang (2004) reports that from1993 to 2003, of themore than1200
firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges,
approximately 200, or one-sixth, were subject to enforcement
action by the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC),
the Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE), or the Shanghai Stock
Exchange (SHSE).We cross-check this ratio based on the CSMAR
fraud database. According to our calculation, from 1993 to 2003,
188 out of 1224 A-share companies were punished for financial
fraud. This equates to a ratio of 15.49 per cent, which is quite
similar to that reported by Zhang (2004).We further calculate the
ratio for 1993–2004 and find that 2,33 out of 1,363 A-share com-
panies were punished for financial fraud between 1993 and 2004.
This equates to a ratio of 16.87 per cent, or more than 1/6.
4. There are three types of stock in the Chinese stockmarket, i.e., A,
B, and H shares. Both the A and B markets are based in main-
land China. A shares, which are denominated in RMB, the
Chinese currency, are traded exclusively by Chinese citizens. B
shares, which are denominated in US dollars on the SHSE and in
HK dollars on the SZSE, were allowed to be traded by foreign
investors only before February 2001. From February 2001, the B
markets were opened up to Chinese citizens who have deposit
accounts in foreign currencies. H shares are traded on the Stock
Exchange of Hong Kong and are denominated in HK dollars.
5. We calculate the firm’s projected need for outside capital
based on the externally financed growth rate constructed by
Demirguc-Kunt and Maksimovic (1998). Specifically, the exter-
nally financed growth rate is a firm’s asset growth rate in excess
of the maximum growth rate that can be supported by the firm’s
internally available capital. The maximum internal growth rate is
the growth rate if a firm relies only on its internal resources and
maintains its dividend:
ROA
ROAt
1
1−
It is obtained by assuming that the firm retains all its earnings.
Where ROAt is the firm’s return on assets (the ratio of earnings
after taxes and interest to total assets), the firm’s external finan-
cial need can be proxied by:
ROA ROA
ROA
ROA
ROA
t t
t
t
t
−
−
−
−
−
−
−
1
1
1
11
6. The Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) was devel-
oped by MSCI, a premier independent provider of global
indices and benchmark-related products and services, and Stan-
dard & Poor’s (S&P), an independent international financial data
and investment services company and a leading provider of
global equity indices. The GICS structure consists of 10 sectors,
24 industry groups, 68 industries, and 154 sub-industries. GICS
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industries included in the sample are: 1,010, energy, 1,510, raw
materials, 2,010, capital products, 2,030, transportation, 2,510,
autos, 2,520, appliances and clothes, 2,020, commercial services
and providers, 2,530, consumer services, 2,540, media, 2,550,
retail, 3,010, food andmain product retail, 3,020, food, drink, and
tobacco, 3,520, pharmacy and biotech, 4,020, financial, 4,040,
property, 4,510, software and services, 4,520, IT, technology,
hardware, and equipment, 5,510, public industry.
7. We do not incorporate the debt restructuring when comparing
the effect of business disassociation with that of business cre-
ation for two reasons: (1) there are only six debt restructuring
announcements in our sample; (2) debt restructuring has a very
large effect. It will conceal the relative contribution difference
between the creation of a business portfolio and disassociation
from business portfolio.
8. We do not incorporate the interaction between debt restructur-
ing and fraud types for two reasons: (1) there are only six debt
restructuring announcements in our sample; (2) as shown in
Model 2, the effect of aggregated organizational restructurings is
significantly weaker than that of aggregated business restructur-
ing at the .01 level. When debt restructuring is not considered,
the difference is not significant at all. This suggests that debt
restructuring has a significant larger effect on the market
response for fraud firms than it does for other restructurings.
Including debt restructuring would conceal the relative contri-
bution difference between organizational restructurings and
business restructurings.
APPENDIX A: EVENT STUDY
We calculate cumulative abnormal return (CAR) following
Dodd and Warner’s procedure (1983).
1. Estimate the daily abnormal return (AR)
AR represents the return earned by the firm adjusted for
the “normal” return process. It is estimated from the market
model:
R Rit i i mt it= + +α β ε (1)
where Rit = the daily return including dividends on the
share price for firm i at time t from the CSMAR individual
stock daily return database. Rmt = the return on a market port-
folio of stocks weighted by common stock on day t from the
CSMAR daily stock market return database. ai and bi are OLS
parameter estimates obtained from the regression of Rit on
Rmt over the 200 days preceding the event.
Based on the estimated equation (1), AR for the ith firm is
estimated by:
AR R Rit it i i mt= − +( )α β (2)
2. Calculate the cumulative abnormal return (CAR)
To capture the full effect of publications, CAR is calculated
over a 3-day event window from one day before to one day
after the announcement day t0.
Following Dodd and Warner (1983), we first compute a
standardized abnormal return (SAR) where the abnormal
return is standardized by its standard deviation:
SAR AR SD SD
S T R R R R
it it it it
i mt m mt m
t
T
=
= × + −( ) −( )⎡⎣⎢
⎤
−
∑
with
2 2 2
1
1 1 ⎦⎥
⎧⎨⎩
⎫⎬⎭
0 5.
where Si2 is the residual variance from the market model as
computed for firm i and Rm is the mean return on the market
portfolio calculated during the estimation period of T days.
The standardized abnormal return can then be cumulated
over an event window of k days to derive the cumulative
abnormal return (CAR) for each firm:
CAR k SARi it
t
k
=
=
∑1 0 5
1
.
APPENDIX B: CODING OF RESTRUCTURINGS AND FINANCIAL FRAUD
Variable Coding in this study CSMAR categories involved Source
Asset
divestment
Has the firm been involved in selling
tangible fixed assets or intangible assets
including stock, equipment, real estate,
property, a product line, or a brand, or in
selling investments in firms in which the
firm does not have majority voting power?
1 = yes, 0 = no
Selling assets
Selling investments
Swapping assets
CSMAR M&A and
restructuring
database
Subsidiary
divestment
Has the firm been involved in selling
investments in a subsidiary in which the
firm has majority voting power?
1 = yes, 0 = no
Selling investments
Swapping investments
CSMAR M&A and
restructuring
database
Debt
restructuring
Has the firm been involved in a debt
forgiveness, a debt rescheduling, and/or
conversion of a portion of debt into
equity?
1 = yes, 0 = no
Debt restructuring
Swapping assets
CSMAR M&A and
restructuring
database
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APPENDIX B: Continued
Variable Coding in this study CSMAR categories involved Source
Asset
acquisition
Has the firm been involved in acquiring
tangible fixed assets or intangible assets
including stock, equipment, real estate,
property, a product line, or a brand?
1 = yes, 0 = no
Acquiring assets CSMAR M&A and
restructuring
database
Stock
acquisition
Has the firm been involved in making
investments and acquiring ownership
rights in firms or buying stock through
the stock market?
1 = yes, 0 = no
Acquiring investments CSMAR M&A and
restructuring
database
CEO dismissal Is there a CEO dismissal?
1 = yes, 0 = no
CEO dismissal CSMAR Corporate
Governance
Database
Ownership
restructuring
Is there a change in owner or in the
owners’ shareholdings?
1 = yes, 0 = no
Ownership restructuring CSMAR M&A and
restructuring
database
Board
chairman
succession
Is there a board chairman succession?
1 = yes, 0 = no
Board chairman succession CSMAR Corporate
Governance
Database
Fraudulent
financial
reporting
How many of the following items appear
in a penalty announcement for a firm?
(Fraudulent reporting, inflated profit,
asset fabrication, a delay or
postponement of the annual report or
another required report, and major
failure to disclose information)
6 = fraudulent reporting, 2 = inflated
profit, 3 = asset fabrication, 5 = a
delay or postponement of the
annual report or another required
report, and 8 = major failure to
disclose information
CSMAR corporate
financial fraud
database
Embezzlement How many of the following items appear
in a penalty announcement for a firm?
(Major shareholder embezzlement,
illegal guarantee, unauthorized change
in fund use, and fund provision
violation)
9 = major shareholder embezzlement,
12 = illegal guarantee,
4 = unauthorized change in fund
use, and 7 = fund provision
violation
CSMAR corporate
financial fraud
database
Stock market
Manipulation
How many of the following items appear
in a penalty announcement for a firm?
(Insider trading, stock price
manipulation, and illegal hype)
1 = insider trading, 10 = stock price
manipulation, and 13 = illegal hype
CSMAR corporate
financial fraud
database
Improper
accounting
practice
How many of the following items appear
in a penalty announcement for a firm?
(Erroneous accounting practice or
reporting practice)
14 = Others CSMAR corporate
financial fraud
database
Notes:
1 Most of the coding for restructurings is the same as CSMAR coding. The only difference is that CSMAR has a category of asset swaps
in which firms swap assets and investments with other firms’ assets and investments. We re-examine the content of the asset swap. When
the asset swap is associated with a sale of tangible fixed assets or intangible assets including stock, equipment, real estate, property, a
product line, or a brand, or with a sale of investments in firms in which the firm does not have majority voting power, we code the firm
as being involved in an asset divestment.When the asset swap is associatedwith debt forgiveness, a debt rescheduling, and/or conversion
of a portion of debt into equity, we code the firm as being involved in a debt restructuring. When the asset swap is associated with an
acquisition of tangible fixed assets or intangible assets including stock, equipment, real estate, property, a product line, or a brand, we code
the firm as being involved in an asset acquisition. When the asset swap is associated with investment in and the acquisition of ownership
rights in firms or with buying stock through the stock market, we code the firm as being involved in a stock divestment.
2 In CSMAR coding for financial fraud, there is an additional type of fraud, i.e., fraud in the listing procedure (11 = fraud in listing
procedure). However, no firm was punished for this type of fraud from 1998 to 2004.
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